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Abstract
We model a market where the surpluses from seller-buyer matches are heterogeneous
but common knowledge. Price setting is synchronous with search: buyers simultaneously
make one personalized oﬀer each to the seller of their choice. With impatient players
eﬃcient coordination is not possible, and both temporary and permanent mismatch
occurs. Nonetheless, for patient players eﬃcient matching (with monopsony wages) is
an equilibrium. The setting is inspired by a labor market for highly skilled workers, such
as the academic job market, but it can be easily adapted to, for example, the housing
market or internet advertising auctions.
JEL classiﬁcation: C78, D43, J44
Key words: Diamond paradox, eﬃcient matching, directed search
∗I wrote the ﬁrst draft of this paper while enjoying the hospitality of UC Santa Cruz. I am also grateful
for comments to Gadi Barlevy, Gianni De Fraja, Mike Elsby, Philipp Kircher, Hodaka Morita, Ga´bor Vira´g
and to seminar participants at Arizona SU, Edinburgh, UC Santa Cruz and Stanford as well as at the EARIE
2012 conference. E-mail address: jozsef.sakovics@ed.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
We consider a labor market for starting professionals whose “quality” is public information.
They could be doctors, lawyers, MBAs, PhDs, fund managers, athletes, musicians, chefs etc.
There is commonly a one-shot, though dynamic, market for them, with no new entrants: the
market is active until there is no co-existence of unﬁlled vacancies and suitable applicants. A
common characteristic of these markets is that the ﬁrms are vertically diﬀerentiated as well,
and hence the productivity of a worker varies with who has hired her. Fitting this scenario,
the distinguishing feature of our model is that – as often in real life1 – wages are set by the
ﬁrms, who – in every period and for each of their vacancies – make a single personalized wage
oﬀer to the worker of their choice. Of course, in the presence of frictions, the ﬁrms need
to balance their wishes against their realistic chances to hire a worker who is higher in the
pecking order than they are.
While motivated by the labor market, our model can be interpreted as depicting any
two-sided market with transferable utility and unit supply and demand, where each “buyer”
chooses a “seller” to make an oﬀer to.
Search and matching theory has been the standard – and rather successful – method for
the analysis of labor markets, both theoretically and empirically.2 Our contribution belongs
to the family of complete information models within this literature. This sub-ﬁeld can be
split into two camps. One of them uses ex post wage setting: ﬁrst ﬁrms and workers meet
(according to some well-speciﬁed procedure, described via a matching function) and once they
are matched they negotiate the wages. These models typically exhibit a hold-up-like feature,
often referred to as the Diamond (1971) paradox:3 despite the existence of either unemployed
workers or unﬁlled vacancies, the terms of trade – wages – are determined as if the negotiation
1Even if actually workers apply ﬁrst, they typically use “blanket” application strategies, eﬀectively giving
the relevant choice over to the ﬁrms.
2See Rogerson et al. (2005) and the Scientiﬁc Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2010, for surveys.
3Several alternative versions of the paradox circulate, but this is our preferred one.
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among the matched parties were taking place in isolation, with no outside opportunities, no
matter how inexpensive it is to switch partners. The alternative family of models has ex ante
wage setting (directed search), where the ﬁrms commit to wage oﬀers before the matching
occurs (see Butters (1977), Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991) and their followers4). Here
hold up is no longer a problem and the matching process is also more interesting, as now the
workers can condition their search strategy on the posted wages, which then feeds back into
the competition among ﬁrms. Our model does not ﬁt into either camp neatly. In principle, the
targeted nature of the oﬀers could be interpreted as an extreme form of directed search, where
a worker can only search within the pool of ﬁrms that have made her an oﬀer.5 Nonetheless,
our model also has some ex post ﬂavor, as wages can be “re-negotiated”: a worker can reject
all her oﬀers, if she expects better ones to materialize in the future.
Naturally, we are interested in the eﬃciency and distributional properties of this market.
Note that it is liable to suﬀer from two types of ineﬃciency, caused by market imperfections:6
the coexistence of unﬁlled vacancies and qualiﬁed job seekers (frictional unemployment); and
mismatch, where matched workers could be reassigned to diﬀerent jobs in a way to increase
aggregate production.7
We derive the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium for the case of two ﬁrms – and at least
two workers – ﬁrst. When the workers are suﬃciently impatient, the equilibrium involves
“double mixing”: ﬁrms use mixed strategies both to select the worker to target and the wage
oﬀered to the best worker. Consequently, with positive probability, the outcome exhibits both
4There is also a smaller literature, started by McAfee (1993), on competing mechanism designers, where
instead of wages, entire mechanisms (for wage determination) are posted by the ﬁrms.
5It is important to observe that the most important feature is not that the oﬀers are personalized, rather
that they are restricted to a single recipient. If ﬁrms could make a personalized oﬀer to each worker simulta-
neously, the outcome would be a competitive equilibrium.
6Of course, there are many other ineﬃciencies associated with the labor market, like structural unem-
ployment, discrimination, distortions caused by labor laws etc. However, these are not caused by the market
institution itself and hence are not subjects of this study.
7Note that this is a diﬀerent deﬁnition of mismatch from Shimer’s (2007), which is closer to structural
unemployment (in a multimarket context).
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(temporary) frictional unemployment and (permanent) mismatch. Wages are below the ﬁrm-
optimal competitive wage and with positive probability they are as low as the monopsony
wages.
As the workers’ discount factor rises, the upper end of the support of the wage distribution
for the best worker stays constant, at her lowest competitive wage, as it is the weaker ﬁrm’s
option of hiring the second best worker what limits how much it is willing to bid for the best
worker. Note that this implies that the ﬁrms’ expected payoﬀs are unchanged. The increased
patience of the best worker manifests itself in an increase of the lower bound of the common
support of the mixed wages oﬀered to her (which, in fact, is her continuation value when she
receives two oﬀers). As the ﬁrms’ – and the rest of the workers’ – payoﬀs stay constant, any
resulting increase in her payoﬀ would come from capturing eﬃciency gains. The latter are
not guaranteed though as – in order to keep the weaker ﬁrm indiﬀerent between oﬀering to
the two best workers – the best ﬁrm must increase the probability of oﬀering a wage equal to
her outside option to the best worker, countervailing the eﬀect of the (stochastically) higher
mixed oﬀers.
When both discount factors are suﬃciently high, the lower bound of the mixing support
hits the upper bound and the equilibrium undergoes a metamorphosis: the weaker ﬁrm gives
up on trying to compete for the best worker, and in equilibrium each ﬁrm targets its eﬃcient
match. In the resulting absence of competition the wages are the monopsony ones. While
eﬃcient matching when frictions are still present is remarkable, even more striking is that the
equilibrium has a distinct Diamond paradox ﬂavor: we have a nearly frictionless decentralized
market leading to the monopsony wages. As we explain below, the underlying logic is entirely
diﬀerent though, it has nothing to do with the hold-up scenario.
Take the eﬃcient strategy proﬁle, where each ﬁrm makes an exclusive oﬀer to its corre-
sponding worker and hence wages are the monopsony ones (call them zero). At ﬁrst glance,
one might think that this cannot be part of an equilibrium. If both ﬁrms oﬀer zero then
there seems to exist a proﬁtable deviation where the weaker ﬁrm oﬀers ε > 0 to “poach” the
better worker. However, outbidding one’s competitor is not suﬃcient to obtain the services
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of a worker. It is also necessary that the worker be willing to accept this higher wage. As it
happens, the fact that the worker was willing to accept zero in the putative equilibrium does
not imply that she would also accept a deviant oﬀer of ε by a competing ﬁrm. The diﬀerence
is that, in equilibrium, rejecting the oﬀer would only delay the inevitable, as no other ﬁrm
would be around to put an upward pressure on the wage. Yet, rejecting both oﬀers following
the deviation would lead to a subgame where there are still two ﬁrms left. As described
above, the continuation value of the best worker following such a double rejection approaches
the (lowest) competitive wage as the discount factors tend to 1. Since she would reject any
lower oﬀer, by the very deﬁnition of this competitive wage, the incentive to poach disappears
exactly at the limit, where the higher wage cancels out the higher productivity.
Our model of the labor market also includes a (small) vetting cost, which comes into play
here. This cost is incurred by the ﬁrms when they make the ﬁrst binding oﬀer to a worker
(subsequent oﬀers to the same worker are free). As a result, if – following a deviation by the
weaker ﬁrm – the best worker receives two oﬀers, her continuation value is that of a game
with these two ﬁrms, where the vetting cost of (only) this worker has already been incurred
by both ﬁrms. Such a game is biased in favor of the best worker, as ﬁrms now need to pay
another vetting cost to make an oﬀer to a weaker worker but not if they continue to bid for
her. Consequently, the upper bound of the wage distribution for the best worker shifts up
by the value of the vetting cost. That is, in the continuation game the highest possible wage
oﬀers are strictly higher than in the ﬁrst period. As the mixing interval collapses on its upper
bound, for high enough discount factors the continuation value of the best worker is strictly
higher than her lowest competitive wage, which is the highest wage the weaker ﬁrm is willing
to pay her in the ﬁrst period. Hence, neither poaching nor mixing can happen and we end
up with the “Diamond” equilibrium as the unique outcome even for discount factors strictly
below 1.
Note that it is exactly the improvement in the workers’ bargaining position that leads to
the equilibrium with the lowest possible wages. Because the workers are so powerful when
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there is competition for them, the ﬁrms shy away from competition.8 Workers would actually
beneﬁt from being able to commit to accepting below competitive wages!
The characterization of equilibria becomes exceedingly diﬃcult as the number of ﬁrms
grows. Nevertheless, we show that the Diamond outcome continues to be an equilibrium
for an arbitrary number of ﬁrms, if the discount factors are suﬃciently high. We can do
that because in the continuation following a unilateral deviation by a ﬁrm from the eﬃcient
equilibrium there are always only two ﬁrms left – since all the others will have traded according
to the equilibrium strategies – which is exactly the situation we have already characterized.
We also show that the above result is robust: it does not matter how many vacancies ﬁrms
have; whether there are more workers than ﬁrms; whether workers can be vetted in batches;
or whether the workers can hold on to an oﬀer or not.
On the other hand, when ﬁrms can commit not to make a second oﬀer to the same worker
the Diamond equilibrium is no longer possible: as the combination of commitment and lack
of direct competition eliminates the high continuation value for a worker who receives two
oﬀers. When there are only two ﬁrms, the equilibrium is like the mixed strategy one above,
with the only diﬀerence that now workers have a zero continuation value, so the support for
the wage distribution starts at the better worker’s outside option, leading to a lower expected
wage for her.
8While reminiscent of it, this eﬀect is distinct from that of “potential competition”. In the industrial
organization literature (c.f. Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988) it has been observed that the disciplining eﬀect
of potential competition diminishes with the intensity of the ex post competition (e.g. no ﬁrm is willing to
pay a ﬁx cost to engage in a symmetric Bertrand competition). In our case the intensity of competition is
unchanged; it is the “demand” what decreases with patience.
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1.1 A brief review of the closely related literature
The most relevant direct precursor to this contribution is De Fraja and Sa´kovics (2001).9
They allow for many-to-one matching (together with ex post price determination) and show
that this potentially creates local market conditions that reverse the aggregate ones. However,
their matching function is exogenously given. In this paper we endogenize who matches with
whom, while maintaining the possibility of market power reversal. In the literature with ex
ante wage setting mentioned above, not only is there no reversal, but one side of the market
sets the conditions of trade and the other chooses who to attempt to trade with. In the
current model the same side of the market takes both decisions, thereby changing the nature
of competition.
Shi (2001) also presents a model with two-sided heterogeneity, where ﬁrms set wages and
they can specify the type of worker they would like to hire. The equilibrium is constrained
eﬃcient and involves no competition for workers. His model diﬀers from ours in two major
respects: First, there is a large number of workers of each skill level. Consequently, targeting
a skill level does not imply targeting an individual. Second, there is free entry of ﬁrms, leading
to zero proﬁts in equilibrium. This makes it easy to discourage poaching. Shi (2002) has a
similar market but the mechanism is directed search with priority, where ﬁrms post wages
for each type of worker and they also state which type of worker they prefer in case they
receive both types of applicant. The resulting equilibrium is similar to what we obtain for low
patience, but with the roles of ﬁrms and workers reversed: high type workers only search for
high type jobs, while low type workers mix between high and low type ﬁrms. In his model,
this equilibrium is (constrained) socially optimal – as all jobs get ﬁlled and a low type worker
never takes the job of a high type one – but it does involve unemployment as workers have
9Julien et al. (2000) analyze a model with homogeneous ﬁrms and workers, where it is the workers who
start by announcing a reserve wage. This is followed by the ﬁrms simultaneously approaching one worker
each. Workers ﬁnally auction their labor to the ﬁrms who have approached them (the latter having observed
the number of their competitors). Note that bidding and search are not synchronous, even if there is some
“targeting”. The model is geared towards the eﬀects of coordination frictions on wage patterns.
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no second chance if their applications fails, unlike in the current model.
We use the same set-up as Bulow and Levin (2006), except that they consider universal
wages: a ﬁrm must hire the best worker that shows up for the wage it has advertised. While
this is the opposite of targeting, their model provides an interesting benchmark to compare
our results to. Their unique (mixed strategy) equilibrium exhibits some mismatch but no
frictional unemployment. Wages are not only infra-competitive but they are compressed: the
better the worker the farther below competitive her (expected) wage is. Importantly, due to
the relatively high eﬃciency of the matching, the ﬁrms beneﬁt from the losses of the workers:
they earn supra-competitive proﬁts.
The closest paper to ours is Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008). While they do not have
the same motivation, they also present a model with targeted oﬀers – in the context of an
abstract assignment problem. The dynamic variant of their model is cleverly set-up in a way
that avoids simultaneous competition in equilibrium. By assuming that oﬀers to a worker
are made once and for all and that there is no cost of delay, they are able to construct (pure
strategy) equilibria where only a single ﬁrm makes an oﬀer in each period. Note that their
assumptions amount to giving the last word to the ﬁrm moving later, implying that wage
competition for a worker cannot occur, as whoever attempts to overbid a follower will be
matched by it anyway and hence will not be able to hire that worker. The main point of
our model is to draw attention to the intrinsic interest of (endogenous) instantaneous local
competition in the dynamic context, which was ﬁnessed by Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008).
While their set-up is diﬀerent – they look at a market in its steady state with endogenous
entry, matching is random and goods are perishable – Ponsat´ı and Sa´kovics (2008) also de-
scribe a decentralized market where increasing a friction (in their case the per period cost of
waiting) can improve eﬃciency. As in the current paper, the increased cost helps to make
agents internalize the negative externality they impose on the rest of the participants.
Finally, we should mention that there exist models of centralized labor matching markets
which involve ﬁrms targeting workers and endogenous wages.10 The seminal work in this area
10We consider the large body of models with non-transferable utility too far removed to discuss them in
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is Crawford and Knoer (1981). Their model requires that a ﬁrm – myopically – always oﬀer
to its most preferred worker at the “going” wage vector, thereby enforcing competition and
ensuring a competitive outcome.
2 The model
There are M ﬁrms, each with a single vacancy, and N ≥ M workers, each looking for a
job.11 It is common knowledge that the joint output of Firm I and Worker j would be
pIj > 0. We assume that the output matrix is decreasing in both indices and it is (reverse)
supermodular: ﬁrms with a lower index appreciate more a switch to a worker with a lower
index. Supermodularity arises naturally when the “innate” qualities of ﬁrms and workers are
complements, while at the same time it simpliﬁes the analysis and provides a straightforward
benchmark for eﬃcient matching.
If Firm I hires Worker j at wage wIj then the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is pIj − wIj, while the worker
obtains wIj. For convenience, the no-trade payoﬀs of both ﬁrms and workers are normalized
to zero.
2.1 Competitive equilibria
We start by establishing the competitive benchmark: the hypothetical outcome in a central-
ized, frictionless market. The deﬁning characteristic of such an equilibrium is that – taking
the wages paid in equilibrium as given – no ﬁrm would want to hire a worker diﬀerent from
the one it hires in equilibrium. Recall that due to the complementarity of worker and ﬁrm
types, the eﬃcient matching is positively assortative (c.f. Becker, 1973).
Proposition 1 All competitive equilibria are eﬃcient: Firm I hires Worker i. Moreover, in
the ﬁrms’-best competitive equilibrium, wages are wcM = 0 and w
c
j =
∑M
I=i=j+1 (pI,i−1 − pI,i)
this short overview.
11We analyze the case of N < M in Section 4.1 and we extend our results to multiple vacancies in Section
4.2.
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for j ∈ {1, ...,M − 1}.
The proof is in the Appendix.
It is useful to observe that this wage vector would be the outcome of a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves auction, where ﬁrms bid their valuation for each worker (truthfully, in equilibrium),
the assignment is eﬃcient, and the wages paid by a ﬁrm reﬂect the externality it imposes on
the rest of the ﬁrms: the presence of Firm j forces each ﬁrm with index above j to hire a
worker of one lesser rank than they would otherwise.
3 Targeted wage setting
We assume that the decentralized market operates as follows. In period 1, simultaneously
and independently, each ﬁrm makes an oﬀer to a single worker of their choice. For each ﬁrm
it costs c > 0 to approach a worker for the ﬁrst time. Any subsequent oﬀers to the same
worker are free.12 We assume that c < min pIj, so that it does not discourage any match.
The workers who receive (one or more) oﬀers either accept the highest of those (in case of
a tie they go with the better ﬁrm)13 – in which case the ﬁrm whose oﬀer has been accepted
12One can interpret c as the administrative cost of vetting a worker. Say, the work permit must be checked.
Or, c could be the (search) cost of sifting through applications.Alternatively, it could be that only the ordinal
ranking of workers is common knowledge and the vetting is needed to ﬁnd out the exact productivity.
We could also extend the model to endogenize the decision to vet. Say, there is a small probability that
the candidate is not suitable. For small vetting cost, the optimal policy would be to vet candidates with a
probability high enough so that an unsuitable candidate would be indiﬀerent to chance getting caught. In
that case c would be the expected vetting cost and pij the expected productivity (as with positive probability
unsuitable workers would be hired).
We could also have a vetting cost that is proportional to the risk incurred (that is, to wages). As long as
this were always positive – in other words taking into account that the zero minimum wage is a normalization
– our results would be unaﬀected.
13That is we assume that workers have lexicographic preferences, with wages dominating the preference for
working at a better ﬁrm.
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and the worker collect their payoﬀs and exit the market – or reject all oﬀers (we discuss the
case where workers can hold on to oﬀers in Section 4.4). In the subsequent periods there is
no further entry: the ﬁrms with unﬁlled vacancies keep making oﬀers to the available workers
until all vacancies get ﬁlled. Firms and workers discount the future by discount factors δ and
β, respectively.
We start the analysis with the “simple” case of only two ﬁrms:
3.1 Duopsony
Let us denote the more productive (lower index) ﬁrm by H and the other one by L. Also let
the eﬃcient (lowest index) partner of H be denoted by h, and the eﬃcient partner of L by l.
The rest of the workers will not play any role. We will refer to the ﬁrms as its, to Worker h
as she and Worker l as he. We can characterize the equilibrium of our decentralized market
as follows:
Proposition 2 When c < pHh+pLl−pHl−pLh,14 the two-ﬁrm game has a generically unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). There exists a well-deﬁned value,15 w ∈ [0, wch + c], such
that
i) if w ≤ wch: L with probability ΠLl = pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w
c
h
pHh−δ(pHl−c) , oﬀers a zero wage to l, while with
the remaining probability it makes an oﬀer to h, mixing with FLh (x) =
ΠLl
1−ΠLl
· x
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−x
over the interval [w,wch]; H makes an exclusive oﬀer to h, oﬀering zero with probability Z =
pLl(1−δ)+δc
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w and with the remaining probability mixing with F
H
h (x) =
Z
1−Z · x−wpLh−δ(pLl−c)−x
over the interval [w,wch]. h accepts the highest oﬀer she receives. l accepts the oﬀer if he
receives it. Any ﬁrm that does not hire in the ﬁrst period, hires l for zero in the second.
ii) if w ≥ wch : both ﬁrms oﬀer zero to their eﬃcient match and these oﬀers are accepted.
14If the vetting cost is higher than the social cost of mismatch, for w ≥ wch there exists an additional SPE
where there is certain mismatch with monopsony wages.
15As it will become clear, this is the continuation value of Worker h when she receives two oﬀers in the ﬁrst
period.
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The two possible equilibrium conﬁgurations are strikingly diﬀerent. One displays both
frictional unemployment – as, because of L’s mixing over targets, l may not receive an oﬀer
in the ﬁrst period – and mismatch – as, because of the mixed wage oﬀers to h, L may end up
hiring her. It is reminiscent of the equilibrium of ex ante wage setting with uniform wages,
as analyzed in Bulow and Levin (2006).16 The other conﬁguration is fully eﬃcient, but leaves
zero surplus for the workers, along the lines of the equilibrium of ex post wage setting. Both
outcomes give below competitive expected wages to the better worker.
When w = wch there are two equilibria (signaling a discontinuity in the equilibrium set).
In addition to the eﬃcient equilibrium we have an ineﬃcient one – which would be the limit
equilibrium as β → 1 in the absence of vetting costs. In this equilibrium the bids for h are
ﬁxed (L bids wch and H bids zero) but L is still mixing over the target of its oﬀer – and
when it bids for h it wins with positive probability (which tends to one as δ → 1) – so the
ineﬃciency does not disappear.
Proof of Proposition 2: We provide a constructive proof, as it captures the intuition better.
We start by noting that in SPE no ﬁrm will make an oﬀer that it knows will be rejected for
certain. To see this, ﬁrst note that if the oﬀer is rejected by the targeted worker because it
accepts some other ﬁrm’s oﬀer then the ﬁrm is better oﬀ bidding for another worker today.
If it is because no oﬀer is accepted by the targeted worker, then the worker will expect more
later, otherwise she would have accepted today. As a result the ﬁrm cannot expect to be
better oﬀ hiring the same worker later than making her indiﬀerent today. If it expects to
trade with another worker, again it would be better oﬀ bidding for him today.
Let us assume that in the ﬁrst period H bids exclusively for its favorite worker, h. We will
conﬁrm that in any SPE this indeed must be the case later in the proof.
If L bids for h with positive probability, then both L and H must use a mixed strategy for
their bids to h (recall that the workers go with the more productive ﬁrm in case of equal wage
oﬀers). Standard arguments imply that both ﬁrms must mix on the same support, which
we denote by [w,w], except that H may also bid zero in the hope that it is the only bidder
16Though there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences, we elaborate on these in Section 5.
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(because L is bidding for l).17 It is straightforward to see that the only additional possible
mass points in the strategies are at w for L (if and only if H indeed puts positive probability
on zero and w is positive) and at w for H.
We start by hypothesizing that H does not bid zero. In any putative equilibrium, H will
obtain the services of h if L either does not bid for her (with probability Π̂Ll ) or it oﬀers
no more than what H does. If H loses out in the ﬁrst period, it will hire l in the second
period (for zero, as it will face no competition). When H oﬀers the maximum of the common
support, w, then it wins for sure. As it must be indiﬀerent among all bids in the support
of its strategy, the following equality must hold for all x ∈ [w,w] (we denote the cumulative
distribution function of Firm I’s bid for Worker j by F̂ Ij ): (pHh − x)
[
Π̂Ll + Π̂
L
h F̂
L
h (x)
]
+
Π̂Lh
[
1− F̂Lh (x)
]
δ (pHl − c) = pHh − w. Rearranging the equation, we obtain
Π̂Ll + Π̂
L
h F̂
L
h (x) =
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x . (1)
Now, observe that F̂Lh (w) must be zero, since a bid of w could never win as H is bidding with
certainty for h and at least w, leading to
Π̂Ll =
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w. (2)
As L could hire l for free, its bid for h is capped at pLh − pLl. Consequently, w ≤ pLh − pLl <
pHh − pHl < pHh − δpHl, so Π̂Ll > 0 : L makes an oﬀer to l with positive probability as well.
Given that L is making an oﬀer to both workers with positive probability, it must be
indiﬀerent between making an oﬀer to either of them. As it faces no competition for l, it
can hire him for zero, leading to (pLh − x) F̂Hh (x)+
[
1− F̂Hh (x)
]
δ(pLl − c) = pLl ⇔ F̂Hh (x) =
pLl(1−δ)+δc
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−x for x ∈ (w,w). Taking the limit x → w we obtain that F̂Hh (w) =
pLl(1−δ)+δc
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w .
Note that this value is positive, as w ≤ w ≤ pLh − pLl < pLh − δpLl. This would mean that
H bids weakly less than w with positive probability, which rationally can only be an oﬀer of
zero, contradicting the hypothesis that it does not bid zero.
17If h receives a single bid (from H) then l will receive and accept an oﬀer (from L), so in the continuation
h would be left facing H as the only potential employer, forcing him to accept a zero wage.
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We thus know that in SPE H will oﬀer zero to h with positive probability. We drop the
“hats” of F and Π to capture the change in strategy and denote the probability of H making
an oﬀer of zero to h by Z. As we have seen above, H must mix, so Z < 1.
H has to be indiﬀerent between bidding zero (when it only wins if L does not bid for h,
and otherwise it hires l next period) and w (when it wins for sure), so we must have that
pHhΠ
L
l +
(
1− ΠLl
)
δ(pHl − c) = pHh − w ⇒
ΠLl =
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w
pHh − δ(pHl − c) > 0. (3)
By the same token, (1) – without “hats” as we have established that H bids zero with
positive probability – must also hold for all x ∈ [w,w]. Solving for the mixing distribution
we have
FLh (x) =
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w
w
· x
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x ∈ (0, 1]. (4)
Given that L is making an oﬀer to l with positive probability (see (3)), it must be indiﬀerent
between making an oﬀer to either worker. As it faces no competition for l, it can hire him for
zero, leading to (pLh − x)
(
Z + FHh (x)(1− Z)
)
+ (1− Z) (1− FHh (x)) δ(pLl − c) = pLl ⇔
(1− Z)FHh (x) =
pLl(1− δ) + δc
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x − Z, (5)
for x ∈ (w,w). If there is no mass point at the upper end of H’s strategy, limx→w FHh (x) = 1,
then the formula still applies and we obtain that w = pLh − pLl. If there were a mass point,
then in order to keep L from overbidding it must be that for all ε > 0, pLh − w − ε < pLl
⇔ w ≥ pLh − pLl, which when applied to the formula for limx→w FHh (x), implies again that
w = pLh − pLl and FHh (w) = 1, therefore no mass point is possible. From (3), substituting in
for the upper bound, we obtain that ΠLl =
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−wch
pHh−δ(pHl−c) .
When L bids the lower bound of its support, it can only win if H is bidding zero.
Hence, we have that (pLh − w)Z+ (1 − Z)δ(pLl − c) = pLl, from which we can solve for
Z = pLl(1−δ)+δc
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w ∈ (0, 1). Substituting in (5), we obtain
FHh (x) =
x− w
wch − w
· pLl − δ(pLl − c)
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x.
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Next, we identify the lower bound of the support of the mixed strategies. Observe that –
by the single deviation principle – this has to equal the (discounted) expected continuation
value of h, when she receives two oﬀers18 and hence expects both ﬁrms to be still in the
market in the following period.
w
β
= Z˜Π˜Lh F˜
L
h (w)w+
∫ w˜
w
x
[
f˜Hh (x)(1− Z˜)
(
Π˜Ll + Π˜
L
h F˜
L
h (x)
)
+ Π˜Lh f˜
L
h (x)(Z˜ + (1− Z˜)F˜Hh (x))
]
dx.
(6)
Note that the probability distributions (and w) carry a tilde. This is because following two
bids for h, no vetting cost will have to be paid to make a new oﬀer to h, tilting the competition
in favor of h and slightly modifying the formulas. It is crucial to observe that w is invariant
across periods, as it is only invoked following a history (of any length) where both ﬁrms have
paid their vetting costs exclusively for h.
It is straightforward to see that up to (3) and (4) everything remains the same (except
for the substitution of w˜ for w) even after a sunk vetting cost for h. On the other hand, (5)
becomes (1 − Z˜)F˜Hh (x) = (pLl−c)(1−δ)pLh−δ(pLl−c)−x − Z˜, which in turn implies that w˜ = wch + c, which
then leads to Π˜Ll =
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜
pHh−δ(pHl−c) and Π˜
L
h =
w˜
pHh−δ(pHl−c) . Similarly we have
Z˜ =
(pLl − c)(1− δ)
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w and F˜
H
h (x) =
x− w
w˜ − w ·
(pLl − c)(1− δ)
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x. (7)
Substituting into (6), we have
w
β
=
(pLl − c) (1− δ)
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w ·
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜
pHh − δ(pHl − c) ·
w
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− ww +∫ w˜
w
(pLl − c) (1− δ)x
(pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x)2
· pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x dx+ (8)∫ w˜
w
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜
(pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x)2
· (pLl − c) (1− δ)x
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− xdx.
18Whenever L oﬀers to h, she will receive two oﬀers, so this is the relevant scenario for the determination
of the lower bound of L’s bidding distribution.
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After a bit of work19, this simpliﬁes to the following equation:
0 =
w (pHh − pLh − δ(pHl − pLl))
β (pLl − c) (1− δ) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜) −
w2 (pHh − pLh − δ(pHl − pLl))
(pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w) −
(w˜ − w) (pLh − δ(pLl − c))
(pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w) (pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w˜) + (9)
(w˜ − w) (pHh − δ(pHl − c))
(pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜) −
ln
(pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w˜) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w)
(pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜) (pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w) .
The right-hand side of (9) is a continuous function of w, outside of [pLh − δ(pLl − c), pHh −
δ(pHl − c)] where it is not deﬁned. Routine calculations show20 that it is increasing for
w < pLh − δ(pLl − c), and that it takes a negative value at w = 0 and a positive value at
w = w˜. Consequently, there is a unique feasible solution. This completes the description of
the equilibrium when w ≤ wch.
When w ≥ wch, L has no (strict) incentive to bid for h, given that H does bid for him.
Thus we get the eﬃcient matching and, since only one ﬁrm bids for each worker, the wages
are zero. At the knife-edge case when w = wch, both equilibria exist.
Finally, to see that H will not bid for l in any SPE, note that either L is bidding exclusively
for l and hence h could be hired for free (as L would hire l, so h has no credible threat of
rejecting) which is the best possible outcome for H; or L bids for h with positive probability.
If L is bidding for h only, then H could hire l for free, earning pHl, while bidding w˜ for h, it
could obtain its services for certain, yielding a payoﬀ of pHh − w˜. As long as w˜ ≤ pHh − pHl
the latter is preferred. As w˜ ≤ wch + c, c < pHh + pLl − pHl − pLh is a suﬃcient condition.
Finally, consider the case where L is mixing over the target of its oﬀer. This would weaken
H’s option of bidding for l – higher wage needs to be paid – and strengthen it for h – as there
is not always competition for her. Q.E.D.
19Details are in the Mathematical Appendix.
20Details are in the Mathematical Appendix.
16
Of course, the crucial question is: when, if ever, is w ≥ wch? That is, when can the worker
expect more in the continuation than her (lowest) competitive wage? The following corollary
gives the answer. We will write w(δ, β) for the continuation value of h when both ﬁrms bid
for her.
Corollary 1 If w(δ, 1) ≤ wch, then the unique SPE of the two-ﬁrm game is the mixed equi-
librium identiﬁed in Proposition 2. If w(δ, 1) > wch then there exists β
∗(δ) ∈ (0, 1) such
that
i) if β > β∗(δ) (and c < pHh + pLl − pHl − pLh), the unique SPE of the two-ﬁrm game is
eﬃcient matching, with wages equal to the workers’ outside options (zero);
ii) while if β < β∗(δ) then the unique SPE of the two-ﬁrm game is the mixed equilibrium
identiﬁed in Proposition 2.
Finally, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ > δ∗, w(δ, 1) > wch.
Proof: Note that the equation deﬁning w, (9), is of the form g(w, δ, β) = 0. In the
range w ∈ (0, wch + c), g is continuous in δ and β, implying that so is w(δ, β), which is
uniquely deﬁned, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Observe that if δ is such that
w(δ, 1) > wch then, as w(δ, β) is increasing in β by (6) from w(δ, 0) = 0, the required β
∗
exists and is uniquely deﬁned by wch = w(δ, β
∗). Consequently, all we need to show is that
limδ→1w(δ, 1) > wch. We actually show that limδ→1w(δ, 1) = w˜ = w
c
h + c. To see this,
assume to the contrary that limδ→1w(δ, 1) < w˜. As seen from (7), that would imply that
limδ→1 Z˜(δ) = 0. If H never bids zero then an inﬁnitely patient h will never accept a wage
below the upper bound of the mixed strategy, leading to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
When at least one side of the market is impatient, the equilibrium is the ineﬃcient one.
With patient players we have the eﬃcient equilibrium. In the situations mentioned in the
introduction, we would expect the players to be rather patient, so the prediction favors the
Diamond equilibrium.
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It is interesting to note that whether or not we obtain an eﬃcient (though not Walrasian)
outcome in the limit as frictions disappear depends on the order of limits: as we have seen
above, if the vetting costs vanish ﬁrst eﬃciency is not achievable; nonetheless, if it is the
discount factors that hit 1 ﬁrst eﬃciency is obtained, even before reaching the limit.
Another interesting limit is when (worker) heterogeneity disappears. The competitive
wage clearly tends to zero, while the worker receiving two oﬀers will have a continuation
value w = βc > 0, so by Proposition 2 only the Diamond equilibrium survives.
3.2 The general case
The characterization of equilibria for a large number of ﬁrms is very complicated. As there are
multiple oﬀers received by many workers with positive probability, way too many subgames
are possible to allow a clean analysis.
Short of a full characterization, what we are really interested in is whether Corollary 1
generalizes to an arbitrary number of ﬁrms (and workers). We can answer in the aﬃrmative:
indeed, the eﬃcient equilibrium exists if and only if the discount factors are high enough. The
intuition for this is that a unilateral deviation from the eﬃcient equilibrium always leads to
a worker receiving two oﬀers, just as in the duopsony case analyzed above.
In order to state the precise result, we need to introduce some additional notation. For
M ≥ I > j, let wIj denote the continuation value of Worker j when she receives an oﬀer
each from Firms I and J and expects no other ﬁrms and no workers with index below j to
be in the market in the following period. By Corollary 1, there exist δ∗Ij ∈ (0, 1), such that
wIj(δ
∗
Ij, β = 1) = pIj − pIi. Let δ̂ = maxI>j δ∗Ij < 1. Similarly, let β̂(δ) < 1 be the lowest21 β
such that wIj(δ, β) ≥ pIj−pIi for all i > j. Finally, deﬁne ĉ = mini>j{pJj+pIi−pJi−pIj} > 0.
Proposition 3 When
i) either δ < δ̂ or β < β̂(δ), there exists no eﬃcient equilibrium.
21Note that unless it is equal to zero, wIj(δ, β) must be strictly increasing in β.
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ii) δ > δ̂ and β > β̂(δ), there exists a SPE of the game with eﬃcient matching and wages
equal to the workers’ outside options.
Proof: Let us start with i). In an eﬃcient equilibrium no worker can get multiple oﬀers
and consequently the wages must equal the outside options. Take an arbitrary pair of ﬁrms,
I, (>)J. In the putative equilibrium Firm I earns pIi, and hence would be willing to pay pIj−pIi
to hire Worker j. By the deﬁnition of wIj, an oﬀer of pIj − pIi − ε > wIj would be accepted
by Worker j. Therefore, showing that there exist I > j such that pIj − pIi > wIj proves the
claim. If δ < δ̂ then there exist I > j such that δ∗ij > δ, implying that wij(δ, β) < pIj − pIi for
any β. Similarly, if β < β̂(δ) then there exist I > j such that wIj(δ, β) < pIj − pIi, proving
the claim.
For ii), consider a deviation by Firm J, where it makes an oﬀer to worker k 	= j. Since the
equilibrium wages are zero, this can be only proﬁtable if it prefers k to j: k < j. As following
the equilibrium strategies the rest of the ﬁrms will have hired in the ﬁrst period, Proposition
2 applies, with Firm K playing the role of H. Therefore, by the proof of Corollary 1, the
continuation value of Worker k exceeds pJk − pJj, when β > β̂(δ). Thus, for β high enough,
Firm J ’s deviation payoﬀ conditional on Worker k accepting is pJk−(pJk − pJj + ε) = pJj−ε,
less than its equilibrium payoﬀ, pJj. To guarantee that β̂(δ) < 1 we need δ > δ̂.
We still need to check what happens if the deviant oﬀer to Worker k (or indeed, j) is
unacceptable. In that case, the worker would reject both of his oﬀers. In the continuation,
by the proof of Corollary 1, Firm J would end up hiring Worker j for zero, just as in the
putative equilibrium, but suﬀering a delay cost and an extra vetting cost. Hence there exists
no proﬁtable deviation for any ﬁrm.
If a worker rejected his equilibrium oﬀer, next period he would be faced with the same
ﬁrm, as all the other ﬁrms would have hired. He could not improve on his payoﬀ – as any
positive continuation payoﬀ could be slightly undercut by the ﬁrm, and it would be in the
worker’s best interest to accept. Q.E.D.
Even in the absence of a general uniqueness result, it is arguable that in a situation
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where the same ﬁrms face each other repeatedly, like the job markets we model, they would
coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium, which maximizes their aggregate welfare.
What about the other equilibria? We conjecture that there exist variants of the doubly-
mixed equilibrium of the two-ﬁrm model, where each ﬁrm mixes at most over their correspond-
ing worker and the one above.22 However, there seems to be no tractable way of handling
them.
4 Variations
4.1 Workers’ market
In the main text – for simplicity and realism – we have maintained the assumption that the
number of ﬁrms did not exceed the number of qualiﬁed workers looking for a job. Here we
show that the existence of the Diamond equilibrium does not require a ﬁrms’ market, it exists
in a workers’ market just as well. As before, the main insight comes from the set-up following
a unilateral deviation from the Diamond equilibrium: in this case a single worker (and several
ﬁrms). The generalization follows the same arguments of Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 from
there.
Let us denote the ﬁrm that is most productive hiring the worker by H and the second
most productive ﬁrm by L. The corresponding outputs are pH and pL.
Proposition 4 The one-worker-many-ﬁrms game has the following set of SPE:
i) if βpL ≤ pL − c: L with probability ΠL = pH−pL+cpH does not make an oﬀer, while with
the remaining probability it mixes its oﬀer with FL(x) = pH−pL+c
pL−c · xpH−x over the interval
[βpL, pL − c]; H oﬀers zero with probability Y = c(1−β)pL and with the remaining probability
mixes with FH(x) = x−βpL
(1−β)pL−c · cpL−x over the interval [βpL, pL − c]. The worker accepts the
highest oﬀer she receives;
22We have worked one out for the three-ﬁrm case, when δ = β = 0. It has three possible conﬁgurations,
depending on how the productivities are spaced out.
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ii) if βpL ≥ pL − c: H, or any other Firm i such that βpi ≥ pH − c, makes the only oﬀer,
which is zero and is accepted.
The proof is in the Appendix.
4.2 Multiple vacancies per ﬁrm
In the main model we have made the simplifying assumption that each ﬁrm has a single
vacancy. As shown by Kojima (2007), this assumption is crucial for the result of Bulow
and Levin (2006) that ﬁrms (workers) are better (worse) oﬀ with uniform pricing than with
the ﬁrms’-best competitive equilibrium. Nonetheless, we can show that in our model the
assumption is indeed without loss of generality. Let us relabel ﬁrms as vacancies and assume
that several vacancies can be controlled by the same company.
Corollary 2 Companies having multiple vacancies would not aﬀect the existence of the Dia-
mond equilibrium.
Proof: First note that no company would try to compete with itself for a worker. So any
deviation from the Diamond equilibrium must involve a company poaching a worker which
in equilibrium it would not hire. If such a deviation occurs, just as in the main model, all the
other vacancies will be ﬁlled, so in the continuation there only the two vacancies of diﬀerent
companies will be left. This leaves the continuation value of a worker receiving two oﬀers (out
of equilibrium) the same as in the main model. As the equilibrium payoﬀs of the companies
are also unchanged, the incentives to poach continue to be the same. Q.E.D.
Note that Kojima’s (2007) result is driven by the fact that with uniform wages and diﬀering
ﬁrm capacities, some workers would be hired by the same company for any wage vector. The
competitive wage of these would be low but the uniform pricing – within companies – forces
companies competing for other workers to raise it. In contrast, when companies can oﬀer a
personalized wage for each vacancy this externality is absent.
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4.3 Batch vetting
Given the apparent importance of vetting taking place worker by worker, it seems reasonable
to investigate the consequences of the possibility to vet several workers at a time. Consider
the duopsony model. If the weaker ﬁrm vetted both workers in the ﬁrst period, the Diamond
equilibrium would indeed cease to exist for impatient players. Note however, that the weaker
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ would be lower with batch vetting, as she would have the same expected gross
payoﬀ but would incur two vetting costs.23 Therefore, batch vetting would not occur in
equilibrium. Nonetheless, the workers would have an incentive to have themselves certiﬁed
by a reliable agency if that were feasible. Such a move has recently happened in the Scottish
housing market, where sellers are now obliged to provide a “surveyor’s home report” to all
interested buyers.
4.4 Holding on to an oﬀer
In the main text we have assumed that workers had to respond to each oﬀer immediately and
ﬁrms thus could only revise their oﬀer once it has been rejected. There are two ways in which
this assumption can be relaxed.
First, consider the case where workers can delay the decision on an oﬀer for n periods (and
ﬁrms can revise their unaccepted oﬀers in every period). It is straighforward to demonstrate
that this can only increase the range of parameters for which the Diamond equilibrium exists.
Corollary 3 Workers having several periods to ponder an oﬀer would make the Diamond
equilibrium more likely to exist.
Proof: We will show that the continuation value of a worker rejecting two oﬀers can only
improve with the workers’ option to hold on to an oﬀer. As a result, the incentives for a ﬁrm
to deviate from the Diamond equilibrium can only decrease. Recall, that in the continuation
23Even if there were economies of scale in vetting, as long as vetting two workers is more expensive than
vetting one, the result would be the same.
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there are only two workers who receive oﬀers. One of them has no competition for him, so
he has no incentive to wait. The other worker is supposed to accept the highest oﬀer in
equilibrium. If she decides to hold on to it, she must be better oﬀ doing that, increasing her
expected payoﬀ – and thus decreasing the poaching ﬁrm’s. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is simple: the only reason to hold on to an oﬀer (rather than
accept it right away) is the hope of receiving a better oﬀer in the future. This can only
improve a worker’s payoﬀ. It does not happen on the equilibrium path as there are no suitors
left, while the eﬀect oﬀ the equilibrium path only strengthens the equilibrium. The existence
of the mixed equilibrium would be aﬀected in exactly the opposite way. The worker’s ability
to hold on to her oﬀers would make it possible for a ﬁrm to improve its oﬀer in the second
period in case it lost out in the ﬁrst. This would lead to the competitive wage (+c) in the
second period, putting a high lower bound on the mixing interval (w would equal β(wch + c)),
and make this interval collapse ( β(wch + c) ≥ wch ) – ruling out the mixed equilibrium – for
lower levels of impatience.
A second way of relaxing the assumption would be to say that workers have to decide
instantly, but ﬁrms can counter-oﬀer within the same period. This would be similar to having
no discounting, leading to the Diamond equilibrium as the unique prediction. However, even
if this assumption seems superﬁcially more realistic, say, for the case of the academic job
market (oﬀers are exchanged in January-February, while jobs only start in September), we do
know that both departments and fresh PhDs are impatient during the job market even if less
so than if the negotiations were delaying the start of the job.
4.5 Full commitment to wage oﬀers
If in addition to not being able to approach another worker while the original target ponders
the oﬀer the ﬁrm is not allowed to make a second oﬀer to the same worker, the Diamond
equilibrium does disappear.
Assume the ﬁrms make a single take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) oﬀer to the worker of their
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choice, which she has to accept within t periods.24
We start with a general result that equilibria with full commitment must involve simulta-
neous competition.
Proposition 5 With TIOLI oﬀers, in any SPE some worker must receive two simultaneous
oﬀers with positive probability.
Proof: Assume to the contrary, that there exists an SPE where each worker receives
a maximum of one oﬀer on the equilibrium path. Then all these oﬀers would have to be
simultaneous, as they would be accepted immediately and hence any delay in making them
would be suboptimal. If all oﬀers are simultaneous and one per worker, then they must be
zero. But then there is an incentive to deviate and bid ε for a better worker. The ﬁrm
whose worker is “poached” cannot react, while the others hire their equilibrium worker, so
the worker would be compelled to accept. Q.E.D.
Note that Proposition 5 rules out both Diamond-type equilibria and the sequential-move
equilibria of Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008), where ﬁrms make oﬀers one after the other.
This shows that the assumption that leads to their results is the absence of discounting and
not the non-explosive nature of the oﬀers.
In order to get a better feel for what equilibria with full commitment look like, we discuss
the case of a duopsony. When t is zero (exploding oﬀers) then the equilibrium is the same as in
the case without commitment (and low δ), except that the mixing interval starts from zero, as
the continuation value of a worker is zero, since the oﬀer explodes and next period she would
face a monopsony situation. When t > 0, the better ﬁrm would sometimes (for δ high enough)
prefer to wait and see what the other ﬁrm has oﬀered to the better worker, as matching that
oﬀer it would hire the worker for sure. However, anticipating this, the worker would accept
the ﬁrst oﬀer she received, thereby bringing trade forward by one period. Consequently, t > 0
does not aﬀect equilibrium behavior.
24Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) make this assumption, with t = ∞ (and δ = β = 1).
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As the only change is the zero lower bound for the mixing interval, the expected wage
of the better worker is lower with commitment than without it (as long as in the absence
of commitment the mixed equilibrium would prevail). However, the mismatch probability is
increased: note that the weaker ﬁrm before had a mass point at w. With that oﬀer it won
if and only if the better ﬁrm bid zero. Now this same mass is distributed over (0, w], while
the better ﬁrm redistributes the mass he had on (w,w] on to (0, w]. As a result, the weaker
ﬁrm sometimes will win when it bids in (0, w], and it will win more often than before when
it bids in (w,w]. Consequently, the weaker ﬁrm and the weaker worker expect the same as
without commitment, the better worker is clearly worse oﬀ, while the eﬀect on the better ﬁrm
is ambiguous.
With more ﬁrms, the situation is less clear cut. If with positive probability there was
competition for a worker in the second period, she would consider “sitting” on her oﬀer
(when t > 0). Of course, to keep the ﬁrst period oﬀer being mixed – otherwise there would
be no reason to wait and see what the oﬀer was going to be – we would need competition
with positive probability in the ﬁrst period as well. An additional factor is that a ﬁrm may
decide to wait, not in order to learn the realization of a mixed wage oﬀer, but to learn the
realization of mixed targeting: a low productivity ﬁrm may want to wait and see if there was
a coordination failure, leaving some high productivity worker without suitors.
5 A comparison of pricing schemes
As we have seen, in our market eﬃciency can always be achieved if the ﬁrms oﬀer menus of
personalized wages. As we do not observe this in practice, it is worthwhile to see how the
equilibrium outcome changes if we put restrictions on the wages that can be oﬀered. Bulow
and Levin (2006) provide an alternative benchmark, where a ﬁrm can only make a one-time
oﬀer of a single wage, which can be accepted by any worker.25 An alternative procedure is to
25Once the oﬀers are made public, there is either a sequential procedure where workers decide which oﬀer to
accept in decreasing order of their productivity or, equivalently, one can simply assume that a stable matching
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retain the personalized nature of wages from the competitive set-up but to restrict each ﬁrm
to a single such oﬀer, as in this paper.26 The comparison is more meaningful if we restrict
our model to its static variant: δ = β = 0. Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008, Proposition 1)
give a partial characterization result that we can directly employ.
Both games lead to very similar mixed strategy27 equilibria. The targeted game has a
lower upper end of the supports for reach worker and it also puts a higher weight on oﬀering a
zero wage. This points in the direction of expected wages being lower under targeting, though
we do not have a general proof for that.28 The fact that workers other than the bottom one
can be held to their outside options with positive probability is a novel feature in the entire
literature.
The targeted game leads to the ﬁrm optimal competitive proﬁts, while the uniform wage
game leads to higher ones. Overall eﬃciency is likely to be higher for the uniform wage
scheme. A partial explanation for that is that it does not generate unmatched pairs. Note
however, that Mailath et al. (2013) show that, in a setting where investments are made prior
to matching in a competitive market, uniform prices lead to additional ineﬃciencies at the
investment stage.
It is interesting to observe that the main driving forces behind the structures of the two
equilibria are two distinct impossibility results. In the uniform wage model no two ﬁrms can
will result.
26Kawamura and Sa´kovics (2014) look at an intermediate scenario, where the ﬁrms are forced to use uniform
wages for only a subset of the workers, while they can make personalized oﬀers to the rest of them. They
ﬁnd that the accepted personalized wages maintain their competitive distance, while the uniform ones are
determined a` la Bulow and Levin (2006). There are upwards externalities: as the wages in the uniform range
are compressed, personalised wages “above” a uniform range are lower than the competitive ones.
27In the absence of vetting fees pure strategy equilibria can exist in the targeted-wage regime. A typical
example is two ﬁrms and one worker where the weaker ﬁrm makes a potentially loss making oﬀer, which forces
the better ﬁrm to match it.
28A countervailing tendency is that in the uniform wage setup the number of ﬁrms mixing over the same
interval is higher.
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have the same support for their mixed strategy. In the personalized wage model no two ﬁrms
can compete for the same two workers.
6 Conclusion
This paper is about the nature of endogenous competition when agents on one side of the
market have to decide at the same time which agent on the other side to compete for and
what to oﬀer her. We have found that synchronous wage setting sits roughly in between its ex
ante and ex post variants: if agents (especially the passive ones) are impatient the outcome
is reminiscent of directed search, otherwise it is more like matching and bargaining models.
Despite the superﬁcial similarities, we have also identiﬁed that the underlying reasons are
quite diﬀerent.
In the presence of heterogeneity, eﬃcient matching requires the absence of direct com-
petition, but the latter would lead to monopsony rents, making the incentives to compete
too strong to resist. So, what can be done to drive such a market towards eﬃciency? The
surprising answer is to diﬀerentially increase the bargaining power of the passive side of the
market: a local monopsonist retains all of her bargaining power in equilibrium, but if her
preferred seller becomes the target of a “raider” – oﬀ the equilibrium path – the ensuing price
competition drives the raider’s proﬁts down. Thus, paradoxically, the increased bargaining
power has an adverse eﬀect on the passive side of the market, as it scares oﬀ the competition
for them. Nothing untoward is required to achieve the above eﬀect: all we need is a vetting
cost, together with a dynamic set-up where (patient) bid takers can reject all their bids and
send the game to the next period.
Despite its eﬃciency, the Diamond equilibrium suﬀers from a drawback: the workers are
held to their outside options, where the latter are what they would be able to make outside
the market and hence are likely to be very low. In many applications – and also from a
normative point of view – this is not quite appropriate.29 It is therefore of interest to extend
29On-the-job-search is a realistic assumption, which has been used to get around the Diamond paradox
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the model in a such a way that despite the ﬁrms’ making the initial wage oﬀers, the workers
retain some bargaining power. Assume, for example, that if (and only if) a worker receives a
single oﬀer, a bilateral bargaining game ensues. With homogeneous bargaining powers, such
a modiﬁcation would not aﬀect the existence of the eﬃcient equilibrium,30 but would clearly
increase the wages – as the workers would only accept their discounted continuation value in
the bargaining game.
Finally note that other frictions, like (small) uncertainty about productivities, or non-
pecuniary preferences on part of the workers, would neither be substitutes for the vetting
cost, nor would they destroy the eﬃcient equilibrium (in the presence of vetting). Their
eﬀect would be the same on the two-ﬁrm continuation game as in the main game, leaving
the incentives to deviate unaﬀected. The vetting cost is very special in this sense as it has a
diﬀerent eﬀect on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Let us wrap up with a thought about public intervention. As we have seen, increasing the
vetting cost makes the eﬃcient, though very skewed, outcome more likely. It is immediate
that artiﬁcially inﬂating the vetting cost (but not too much, so that it does not overly restrict
entry) via a tax and then transfering the revenue to the workers (say, via tax credits) would
be a move in the right direction.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that as all matches are productive, we cannot have the
coexistence of a vacancy and an unemployed worker in competitive equilibrium. Next, note
30
that no ﬁrm will hire a worker with index higher than N . To see this, note that otherwise
there would be a worker with index lower than N, who did not get hired. This worker and the
ﬁrm who hired the worker with index lower than N would both be better oﬀ (the ﬁrm strictly
so) trading with each other at the wage paid to the worker with index higher than N . Next,
we show that the matching must be positively assortative (PAM). Assume to the contrary
that Firm I hires Worker j < I. Then there must exist a Firm K < I that hires Worker
l > j. For this to be an equilibrium, we would need that no traders would like to switch
partners at the going wages: pKj − wIj ≤ pKl − wKl and pIj − wIj ≥ pIl − wKl, implying
pIj − pIl ≥ wIj −wKl ≥ pKj − pKl, contradicting (reverse) supermodularity. Similarly, if Firm
I hired Worker j > I, then there would exist a ﬁrm K > I that hired a Worker l < j, leading
to the same contradiction. Hence we must have PAM in equilibrium. Using the equilibrium
conditions for PAM yields
pI,i − pI,i+1 ≥ wci − wci+1 ≥ pI+1,i − pI+1,i+1. (10)
Noting that the lowest individually rational salary for a worker is zero and that ﬁrms prefer
low wages completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let us begin the analysis assuming that there are only two ﬁrms.
Consider the subgame where both ﬁrms have made an oﬀer. If the worker rejects both, in the
continuation we have the equivalent of an asymmetric Bertrand competition. This leads to
both ﬁrms oﬀering pL with probability one,
31 and the worker taking H’s oﬀer. Consequently,
the worker’s continuation value in this subgame is βpL.
Let us return to the main game now (maintaining the two-ﬁrm assumption). If L does
not bid, then H’s best response is to bid zero. This can form part of an equilibrium if and
only if any wage that L would be willing to pay – namely, sL ≤ pL − c – would be rejected
by the worker.
31We do not have the mixed strategy equilibrium of Blume (2003), because we have an asymmetric rationing
rule, instead of the standard ﬁfty-ﬁfty used by him.
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If L bids with positive probability then both L and H must use a mixed strategy for their
wage oﬀers (recall that the workers go with the more productive ﬁrm in case of equal wage
oﬀers). Standard arguments imply that both ﬁrms must mix on the same support, which we
denote by [s, s], except that H may also bid zero – possibly outside of this interval – in the
hope that it is the only bidder. It is straightforward to see that the only additional possible
mass points in the strategies are at s for L (and only if H puts positive probability on zero)
and s for H (as a mass point there for L could be simply outbid by H).
We start by hypothesizing that H strictly prefers not to bid zero. In equilibrium, H
will obtain the services of the worker, if L either does not bid for her (what happens with
probability Π̂L) or it oﬀers no more than what H does. If H loses out in the ﬁrst period, it
earns zero. When H oﬀers the maximum of the common support, s, then it wins for sure. As
it must be indiﬀerent among all bids in the support of its strategy, the following equality must
hold for all x ∈ [s, s]: (pH − x)
[
Π̂L +
(
1− Π̂L
)
F̂L(x)
]
= pH − s. Rearranging the equation,
we obtain
Π̂L +
(
1− Π̂L
)
F̂L(x) =
pH − s
pH − x. (11)
Now, observe that F̂L(s) must be zero, since a bid of s could never win against H, leading to
Π̂L =
pH − s
pH − s > 0. (12)
As L is assumed to make an oﬀer with positive probability (12) implies that it must be mixing
between making an oﬀer or not, and hence it must be indiﬀerent. Therefore, (pL − x) F̂H(x)−
c = 0 ⇔ F̂H(x) = c
pL−x . Substituting x = s we obtain that F̂
H(s) = c
pL−s . Note that this
value is positive, as s < s ≤ pL − c. This would mean that H makes an oﬀer no greater than
s with positive probability, which rationally can only be an oﬀer of zero, contradicting the
hypothesis that it strictly prefers not to oﬀer zero.
We thus know that in equilibrium H weakly prefers to oﬀer zero. We drop the “hats” of
F and Π to capture the change in strategy and denote the probability of making an oﬀer of
zero by Y . As we have seen above, H must mix, so Y < 1.
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H has to be indiﬀerent between bidding zero (when it only wins if L does not bid) and s
(when it wins for sure), so we must have that pHΠ
L = pH − s ⇒
ΠL =
pH − s
pH
> 0. (13)
By the same token, (11) – without “hats” as we have established that H bids zero with
positive probability – must also hold for all x ∈ [s, s]. Solving for the mixing distribution we
have
FL(x) =
pH − s
s
· x
pH − x ∈ (0, 1]. (14)
Given that L is not making an oﬀer with positive probability (see (13)), it must be indif-
ferent between making an oﬀer or not. Thus we have (pL − x)
(
Y + FH(x)(1− Y ))−c = 0 ⇔
(1− Y )FH(x) = c
pL − x − Y, (15)
for x ∈ (s, s) . If there is no mass point at the upper end of H’s strategy, limx→s FH(x) = 1,
then the formula still applies and we obtain that s = pL − c. If there were a mass point,
then in order to keep L from overbidding it must be that for all ε > 0, pL − s − ε − c < 0
⇔ s ≥ pL − c, which when applied to the formula for limx→s FH(x), implies again that
s = pL − c and FH(s) = 1, therefore no mass point is possible. From (13), substituting in for
the upper bound, we obtain that ΠL = pH−pL+c
pH
.
When L bids the lower bound of its support, it can only win if H is bidding zero. Hence,
we have that (pL − s)Y − c = 0, from which we can solve for Y = cpL−s ∈ (0, 1). Substituting
in (15), we obtain
FH(x) =
x− s
pL − c− s ·
c
pL − x.
All we have left to do is to identify the lower bound of the support of the mixed strategies.
Observe that – by the single deviation principle – this has to equal the (discounted) expected
continuation value of the worker when she receives two oﬀers32 and hence expects both ﬁrms
to be still in the market in the next period. We have already established that this value is
32Whenever L makes an oﬀer, the worker will receive two oﬀers, so this is the relevant scenario for the
determination of the lower bound of L’s bidding distribution.
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βpL. When pL − c ≤ βpL, it is not proﬁtable for L to make a bid when H is bidding for the
worker. However, we also have to consider the case that H is not bidding. By the same token
as above, when pH − c ≤ βpL, it is not proﬁtable for H to bid when L is bidding for the
worker. Thus, when pH − c ≤ βpL, we have both equilibria.
Let us consider now the case with more than two ﬁrms. We proceed in three steps.
First, we show that the above equilibria continue to be equilibria. Second, we show that no
equilibrium exists with more than two ﬁrms bidding with positive probability. Finally, we
check whether the ﬁrms bidding can be diﬀerent from H and L.
Note that in the two-ﬁrm equilibrium L always expects zero net proﬁt. When pL−c ≥ βpL,
by making a bid that L also makes in equilibrium, any ﬁrm with a lower productivity can
only fare worse than L. By making a bid below βpL the entrant would win with probability
YΠL and it would need to oﬀer at least βpi to be accepted. This leads to an expected gross
proﬁt of pH−pL+c
pH
· c
(1−β)pL (1− β)pi =
pH−pL+c
pH
· pi
pL
· c < c. When pL − c ≤ βpL, pi − c ≤ βpi so
there is no room for a proﬁtable bid for the worker.
Next note that H can guarantee itself pH − pL, the amount it makes in the two-ﬁrm
equilibrium (for low β). Any other player who bids, must expect to recover the vetting cost,
c. Thus, if we had more than two bidders, the worker should expect a lower wage than with
two bidders, what is clearly impossible.
It is straightforward to see that if the two ﬁrms bidding were not H and L then the one
left out could outbid the intruder and expect strictly more than c. Finally, as we have seen
before, Firm i could be the only bidder as long as pH − c ≤ βpi . Q.E.D.
8 Mathematical Appendix
8.1 Intermediate steps to get to (9) from (8):
Dividing across by the common factor in (8), we have
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wβ (pLl − c) (1− δ) (pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w˜)
=
1
pLh − δ(pLl − c)− w ·
w
pHh − δ(pHl − c) ·
w
pHh − δ(pHl − c)− w +∫ w˜
w
x
(pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x) (pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x)2
dx+
∫ w˜
w
x
(pHh − δ(pHl − c)− x)2 (pLh − δ(pLl − c)− x)
dx.
Using that
∫
x
(a−x)2(b−x)dx =
b ln a−x
b−x
(a−b)2 − a(a−b)(a−x) the equation becomes
w
β(pLl−c)(1−δ)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜) −
w2
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)(pHh−δ(pHl−c))(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w) =
pHh−δ(pHl−c)
(pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl))2
(
ln pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜ − ln
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w
)
+
pLh−δ(pLl−c)
pLh−pHh+δ(pHl−pLl) ·
(
1
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w − 1pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜
)
+
pLh−δ(pLl−c)
(pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl))2
(
ln pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜ − ln
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w
pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w
)
+
pHh−δ(pHl−c)
pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl) ·
(
1
pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w − 1pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜
)
=
pHh−δ(pHl−c)
(pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl))2 ln
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w)
(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜)(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)+
pLh−δ(pLl−c)
pLh−pHh+δ(pHl−pLl) ·
w−w˜
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜)+
pLh−δ(pLl−c)
(pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl))2 ln
(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜)(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w)+
pHh−δ(pHl−c)
pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl) ·
w−w˜
(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜) =
1
pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl) ln
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w)
(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜)(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)−
w−w˜
pHh−pLh−δ(pHl−pLl)
(
pLh−δ(pLl−c)
(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w)(pLh−δ(pLl−c)−w˜) −
pHh−δ(pHl−c)
(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w)(pHh−δ(pHl−c)−w˜)
)
.
Moving everything to the LHS and multiplying across by pHh − pLh − δ(pHl − pLl), we
obtain (9).
8.2 RHS of (9) is increasing in w on (−∞, pLh − pLl + c)
To enable Scientiﬁc Workplace, we eliminate the subindices, denoting pHh by H, pLh by h,
pLl by L and pHl by l.
x(H−h−δ(l−L))
β(L−c)(1−δ)(H−δ(l−c)−c−h+L) − x
2(H−h−δ(l−L))
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c))−
(h− L+ c− x)
(
h−δ(L−c)
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(1−δ)(L−c) − H−δ(l−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)
)
−
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ln (h−δ(L−c)−h+L−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)
(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)(h−δ(L−c)−x) .
d( x(H−h−δ(l−L))β(L−c)(1−δ)(H−δ(l−c)−c−h+L))
dx
= − 1
β(δ−1)(L−c)
H−h+Lδ−lδ
H+L−c−h+cδ−lδ
d
(
− x2(H−h−δ(l−L))
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c))
)
dx
= x
H+cδ−lδ
H−h+Lδ−lδ
(H−x+cδ−lδ)2(h−x−Lδ+cδ)2⎛
⎝ Hx− 2Hh− 2c2δ2 + hx+ 2HLδ − 2Hcδ − Lxδ − 2chδ+
2hlδ + 2cxδ − lxδ + 2Lcδ2 − 2Llδ2 + 2clδ2
⎞
⎠
d(−(h−L+c−x)( h−δ(L−c)(h−δ(L−c)−x)(1−δ)(L−c)−
H−δ(l−c)
(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)))
dx
=
H−h+Lδ−lδ
(H−x+cδ−lδ)2(h−x−Lδ+cδ)2(
c2δ2 +Hh− x2 −HLδ +Hcδ + chδ − hlδ − Lcδ2 + Llδ2 − clδ2)
d(− ln (h−δ(L−c)−h+L−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)(h−δ(L−c)−x))
dx
= − H−h+Lδ−lδ
(H−x+cδ−lδ)(h−x−Lδ+cδ) .
Putting the terms together and dividing by H−h+Lδ− lδ > 0, (recall that H−h > l−L
by submodularity of the production function):
− 1
β(δ−1)(L−c)
1
H+L−c−h+cδ−lδ +
x
H+cδ−lδ
1
(H−x+cδ−lδ)2(h−x−Lδ+cδ)2⎛
⎝ Hx− 2Hh− 2c2δ2 + hx+ 2HLδ − 2Hcδ − Lxδ − 2chδ + 2hlδ+
2cxδ − lxδ + 2Lcδ2 − 2Llδ2 + 2clδ2
⎞
⎠
+ c
2δ2+Hh−x2−HLδ+Hcδ+chδ−hlδ−Lcδ2+Llδ2−clδ2
(H−x+cδ−lδ)2(h−x−Lδ+cδ)2 − 1(H−x+cδ−lδ)(h−x−Lδ+cδ) .
Note that the last term is decreasing in x. Therefore we can bound it from below by
substituting the largest possible x = h− L+ c. The last term then becomes
− 1
(H+L−c−h+cδ−lδ)(1−δ)(L−c) . Adding it to the ﬁrst term, we have
1−β
β(1−δ)(L−c)(H+L−c−h+cδ−lδ) .
This is positive as long asH+L−c−h+cδ−lδ > 0, which holds by submodularity and the fact
that c < min{H,L, h, l}.We can multiply the rest of the terms by (H − x+ cδ − lδ)2 (h− x− Lδ + cδ)2
x
H+cδ−lδ ·
[
2δ2(L− c)(c− l) + 2δ(H(L− c) + h(l − c)) + xδ(2c− l − L) + x(h+H)− 2hH]+
δ2(L− c)(l − c)− δ(H(L− c) + h(l − c)) +Hh− x2 =[
δ2(L− c)(l − c)− δ(H(L− c) + h(l − c)) +Hh] [1− 2x
H+cδ−lδ
]
+
x2
[
δ(2c−l−L)+h+H
H+cδ−lδ − 1
]
= (h− δ(L− c))(H − δ(l − c)− 2x+ x2
H+cδ−lδ ).
The ﬁrst term is positive, the second is positive if x < H − δ(l − c). Finally, note that
H − δ(l − c) > H − l + c > h− L+ c, by submodularity. Q.E.D.
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8.3 RHS of (9) is negative at w = 0.⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
x(H−h−δ(l−L))
β(L−c)(1−δ)(H−δ(l−c)−c−h+L) − x
2(H−h−δ(l−L))
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c))−
(h− L+ c− x)
(
h−δ(L−c)
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(1−δ)(L−c) − H−δ(l−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)
)
−
ln (h−δ(L−c)−h+L−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)
(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)(h−δ(L−c)−x)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
x=0
=
(
1
(δ−1)(L−c) +
1
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
)
(c− L+ h)− ln
(
−H+δ(c−l)
h−δ(L−c)
c−L+δ(L−c)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
)
.
Now recall that ln y ≥ 1− 1/y. Hence, the above is no more than(
1
(δ−1)(L−c) +
1
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
)
(c− L+ h)−
(
1 + h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
(δ−1)(L−c)
)
=
c−L+h
(δ−1)(L−c) − H+δ(c−l)H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) −
(
h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
(δ−1)(L−c)
)
.
Multiplying across by (L− c) (1− δ) > 0 we get
L− c− h− (H+δ(c−l))(L−c)(1−δ)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) +
h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l) (H + L− c− h+ δ (c− l)) =
(L− c) (1− δ)
[
1− H+δ(c−l)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l)
]
+ h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l) (L− c− h) =
(L− c) (1− δ) L−c−h
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) +
h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l) (L− c− h) =
(L− c− h)
[
(L−c)(1−δ)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) +
h−δ(L−c)
H+δ(c−l)
]
,
the ﬁrst term is clearly negative, while the second is positive. Q.E.D.
8.4 RHS of (9) is positive at w = pLh − pLl + c.⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
x(H−h−δ(l−L))
β(L−c)(1−δ)(H−δ(l−c)−c−h+L) − x
2(H−h−δ(l−L))
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c))−
(h− L+ c− x)
(
h−δ(L−c)
(h−δ(L−c)−x)(1−δ)(L−c) − H−δ(l−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)
)
−
ln (h−δ(L−c)−h+L−c)(H−δ(l−c)−x)
(H−δ(l−c)−h+L−c)(h−δ(L−c)−x)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
x=h−L+c
=
1
H+δ(c−l)
(c−L+h)2
c−L+δ(L−c)
H−h+δ(L−l)
H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) − 1β(δ−1)(L−c) (c− L+ h) H−h+δ(L−l)H+L−c−h+δ(c−l) .
Dividing by the common positive term (c−L+h)(H−h+δ(L−l))
H(h−lδ)+c(δ−1)−L(h−l) :
1
β(δ−1) · 1c−L + 1H+δ(c−l) c−L+h(δ−1)(L−c) .
Multiplying by (L− c) (1− δ) :
1
β
− c−L+h
H+δ(c−l) =
H+δ(c−l)−β(c−L+h)
(H+δ(c−l))β >
H−(c−L+h)
(H+δ(c−l))β =
H−h+L−c
(H+δ(c−l))β > 0.
Q.E.D.
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